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Abstract
We examine the impact of the e 5 billion German Cash for Clunkers program on vehicle reg-
istrations and respective CO2 emissions. To construct proper counterfactuals, we develop the
multivariate synthetic control method using time series of economic predictors (MSCMT) and
show (asymptotic) unbiasedness of the corresponding effect estimator under quite general con-
ditions. Using cross-validation for determining an optimal specification of predictors, we do not
find significant effects for CO2 emissions, while the stimulus’ impact on vehicle sales is strongly
positive. Modeling different buyer subgroups, we disentangle this effect: 530,000 purchases were
simply windfall gains; 550,000 were pulled forward; and 850,000 vehicles would not have been
purchased in absence of the subsidy, worth e 17 billion.
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1 Introduction
In response to the recent economic downturn, governments around the globe intervened with
vehicle retirement schemes worth more than e 15 billion in total. European countries con-
tributed almost 60% of this amount, with Germany affording the most expensive program
utilizing e 5 billion to subsidize two million car purchases. As for most countries, the primary
purpose of such programs was twofold: stimulating the declining demand for new vehicles,
which threatened not only the local automotive market but the economy as a whole; and
reducing road traffic related carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions.
In this paper, we seek to measure whether these goals were accomplished, examining the
impact of the German scrappage scheme on purchases of new vehicles and greenhouse gas
emissions. To be more precise, we are evaluating effects on new passenger car registrations
and how these can be disentangled into windfall gains, pull-forward and delayed purchases,
as well as on-top sales. In a next step, we estimate how corresponding CO2 emissions of new
passenger cars behave in consequence of the policy intervention and relate those findings to
our sales results.
The main challenge regarding an impact analysis of this kind arises from the difficulty to
construct a reasonable counterfactual of new car registrations and CO2 emissions in absence
of the subsidy. To identify our effects of interest, we use a rich data pool of 12 European
countries, Germany with and eleven countries without a scrappage scheme, as well as several
covariates to which we apply a generalized and extended version of synthetic control methods
(SCM).1 SCM rest upon the comparison of outcome variables between a unit representing the
case of interest, i.e. Germany as affected by the policy intervention, and otherwise similar but
unaffected units reproducing an accurate counterfactual. An algorithm-derived combination
of precisely weighted comparison units is supposed to depict better the characteristics of
Germany than either any single comparison unit alone or an equally weighted combination
of all or several available control units. Using an appropriate set of covariates, also known as
1SCM, introduced in Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010), were applied, i.a., by Cav-
allo et al. (2013) (natural disasters), Jinjarak et al. (2013) (capital inflows), Kleven et al. (2013) (taxation
of athletes), Acemoglu et al. (2016) (political connections), and Gardeazabal and Vega-Bayo (2017) (politi-
cal/economic integration).
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economic predictors, SCM select the counterfactual unit as the optimally weighted average of
such comparison units that best resembles the pre-treatment characteristics of Germany.
The original SCM approach addresses one respective variable of interest at a time. The M
dimension of our multivariate synthetic control method using time series (MSCMT), however,
allows to consider multiple outcomes simultaneously. Therefore, it takes into account possible
interdependencies between the outcomes of interest, new car registrations and CO2 emissions
of newly registered cars. The standard SCM approach is also not capable of treating time-
varying covariates as separate time series objects. Thus, if one wants to incorporate such
economic predictors, one is restricted to either use only aggregate data like their mean, or
to artificially treat every value of a time-varying covariate as a separate economic predictor.
Both these alternatives have significant drawbacks. The latter is violating the principle of
parsimony and comes with practical problems because the number of quantities that need to
be estimated grows too large. The former comes at the cost of potentially biased estimates
when the variable(s) of interest depend on lagged values of the economic predictor(s). The T
dimension of our MSCMT approach overcomes these problems. It uses whole time series of the
economic predictors and treats them as a single time series object each, thereby exploiting the
predictors’ variation over time in order to find the most precise counterfactual for Germany.
In accordance with these extensions, we formally show that under conditions more gen-
eral than those considered in the original approach by Abadie et al. (2010), a potential bias
of the effect estimator is a linear function of the pre-intervention approximation errors, and
that in case of unobserved confounders, the effect estimator is still asymptotically unbiased.
Eventually, the majority of SCM applications merely operate in-sample, making it difficult to
assess the counterfactual’s validity. To mitigate this problem and to determine optimal pre-
dictor weights throughout a specification search, we incorporate a generalized cross-validation
approach: the pre-treatment timespan is divided into a training and a validation period, and
predictor weights are selected by minimizing the out-of-sample error in the validation window.
Lastly, we also use this technique to show how powerful it is to use the T -dimension of our
covariates as compared to simply relying on their means.
Applying MSCMT, we find that the German scrappage program had an immensely positive
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effect on new car registrations with more than one million program-induced vehicles during
its peak time. In order to disentangle program-affected purchases, we build on a model of
different sales sub-groups and estimate corresponding shares in the overall effect. We find that
530,000 sales were windfall gains, i.e., subsidized purchases that would also have happened in
absence of the policy intervention. In terms of shifting demand in time, the program triggered
the pulling forward of 550,000 sales, because buyers wanted to profit from the scrappage
premium. Contrarily, 260,000 buyers, which were not eligible for the subsidy, delayed their
purchases until the German program had ended. Eventually, the program also induced 850,000
purchases of new cars that would not have happened at all in absence of the German subsidy.
In monetary terms, these on-top sales translate into more than three times the e 5 billion
budget, notably boosting the German car market.
Regarding the second variable of interest, CO2 emissions, our MSCMT estimates yield non-
significant effects throughout the program period. Disentangling group-specific impacts, we
find that the non-significant result in 2009 is due to two different effects essentially balancing
each other. On the one hand, average CO2 emissions of newly registered cars in 2009 were
reduced since the program mainly pushed demand towards small, eco-friendly vehicles. On the
other hand, the e 2,500 subsidy induced many consumers to upgrade their purchases towards
larger, more polluting ones. Due to these upgrades, increased emissions over the lifetime of the
new vehicles might more than offset the reduction of CO2 emissions resulting from scrapping
the clunkers, such that the environmental premium might have hurt the environment in the
long-run.
By analyzing the consequences of scrappage schemes, we join a dynamic literature ex-
amining stimulus impacts of, i.a., tax rebates, income tax changes, or government spending
on infrastructure and education (Parker et al., 2013; House and Shapiro, 2006; Feyrer and
Sacerdote, 2011). On a more profound level, our paper is closely related to several studies of
scrappage programs as a reaction to (recent) economic crises. Amongst others, Mian and Sufi
(2012), Li et al. (2013), Copeland and Kahn (2013), and Hoekstra et al. (2017) use alternative
identification strategies to show that the positive effect of the 2009 U.S. scrappage program
’CARS’ on new vehicle sales during its two months duration came entirely at cost of a reversed
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effect the following months.2 Studies looking at recent scrappage subsidies and their influences
on the environment are, i.a., Knittel (2009) and, again, Li et al. (2013). Such papers look at
the cost of reducing CO2 and find that, with about $300-$450 per ton, the U.S. Cash for
Clunkers program was an expensive way to reduce greenhouse gases.3
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we provide counterfactual
evidence regarding new vehicle sales and greenhouse gas emissions caused by the German
program. Second, we are, to the best of our knowledge, first to expand on such results by
providing a detailed model to precisely estimate the share and impact of different sub-groups in
the overall sales and emission effect: windfall gains, pull-forward and delayed effects, as well as
on-top sales. We use those findings to understand better whether the intervention was effective
in achieving its declared goals and how to potentially improve scrappage programs to come,
issues that are of particular importance to policy makers. Third, since such analyses demand
a proper method of identification allowing for multiple, interdependent outcomes of interest,
we develop MSCMT. This generalized and extended version of SCM not only allows to jointly
synthesize with respect to several dependent variables, but also to utilize entire time series of
economic predictors. In contrast to Gobillon and Magnac (2016) and Xu (2017), who also use
time-varying covariates, we do not use post-treatment values of these variables. This would
only be justified if the covariates’ actual and counterfactual post-treatment values coincide,
an (implicit) assumption that we do not want to make for the case of the German scrappage
program. Robbins et al. (2017), who also consider multiple outcomes, look at a setting with
high-dimensional data at a granular level, where the treated area has several cases and a large
number of untreated comparison cases exists. This is quite different from our aggregated,
country-specific Cash-for-Clunkers scenario, which is a rather typical setting for synthetic
control applications. We show that the combination of our M and T generalizations leads to
(asymptotically) unbiased estimates under quite general conditions. Lastly, we demonstrate
how to link this approach with a cross-validation technique determining optimal predictor
2Adda and Cooper (2000), Licandro and Sampayo (2006), Schiraldi (2011), and Grigolon et al. (2016)
evaluate European scrappage schemes.
3Moreover, Sandler (2012) analyzes the cost-effectiveness of a long-running local scrapping program in Cali-
fornia (1996-2010), finding the average cost-effectiveness to be much lower than expected. More environmental
analyses of past programs are, e.g., those of Hahn (1995) or Szwarcfiter et al. (2005).
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weights.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes car scrappage
programs during the crisis with a particular focus on Germany and presents our data set
including first descriptive evidence of the two outcomes of interest. We develop MSCMT and
present its properties in Section 3, while proofs are relegated to Appendix A. Section 4 provides
overall MSCMT results for our two outcomes including cross-validation and standard placebo
tests. Section 5 lays out our foundation for modeling different vehicle sub-groups and presents
estimates on how the program helped to stabilize the car market at the cost of potentially
hurting the environment in the long-run. Section 6 concludes.
2 Program, Data, and First Evidence
Cash for Clunkers
During 2008–2010, there were similar scrappage programs in 22 different countries around
the globe. The biggest overall budget was provided by Germany with e 5 billion, followed
by Japan with about e 2.9 billion. The U.S. spent about e 2 billion and ranks third. In per
capita figures, Germany invested about e 61, almost three times as much as Japan, Italy, and
Luxembourg respectively, who all spent a little more than e 20. The U.S. ranks twelfth with
about e 6.50 per capita. Worldwide, about e 15.3 billion were spent on vehicle retirement
programs while the European Union contributed e 8.8 billion or 58% of this sum. The e 5
billion spent by Germany totaled 33% of the worldwide budget and 57% of what was spent
by all European countries.
In Germany, the idea for a scrappage program was introduced by then vice-chancellor
Frank-Walter Steinmeier in an interview on December 27, 2008. Only two weeks later, the
federal government passed the Economic Stimulus Package II including a scrappage scheme—
called “environmental premium”. This extremely narrow timing, i.e. fast implementation of
the program, comprises a very nice feature of this policy intervention since it almost acted as a
true exogenous shock to the demand side. The program officially started on January 14, 2009,
financed by the Investment and Repayment Fund. First key points were published on January
5
16, 2009, by the responsible agency BAFA4. The subsidy of e 2,500 could be requested by
private individuals who scrapped an old passenger car which had to be at least nine years
old and licensed to the applicant for at least 12 months. These eligibility criteria were, again,
unforeseeable and actually arbitrary, introducing even more exogeneity. Eventually, the new
car had to be a passenger car fulfilling at least the emission standard Euro 45. Applications
were possible until the end of 2009 or the exhaustion of the budget. The latter happened on
September 2, 2009, when 2 million new cars had been subsidized.6
Data & Outcomes of Interest
For our upcoming analysis, we gathered data from EUROSTAT covering Germany and 11
European countries without a (recent) car scrappage program. The latter are Belgium, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, and Swe-
den. Our two outcomes of interest are the monthly figures of new passenger car registrations
and the annual average CO2 emissions of newly registered passenger cars, with time series
ranging from 2004 until 2012.
We have chosen these variables for several reasons. First, we use figures for registrations of
new cars instead of, e.g., sales, because the latter almost immediately translate into the former
and registration figures are, in contrast to sales figures, robust to cross-border consumption
and trade. Additionally, data on new car registrations are collected by official agencies at a
monthly frequency. Only with data of this frequency, it becomes possible to disentangle the
program’s effects, calculating how many of the subsidized vehicles would have been purchased
anyway (windfall gains), how many had been shifted in time (pull-forward and delayed sales),
and how many would not have happened in the absence of the intervention (on-top purchases).
Second, concerning environmental pollution, we work with average CO2 emissions of newly
registered cars because these data allow to project overall CO2 emissions over the entire
4Bundesamt fu¨r Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle (Federal Office of Economics and Export Control).
5European emission standards define the acceptable limits for exhaust emissions of new vehicles sold in EU
member states. Actually, for the German case, this prerequisite was redundant since all new cars bought in
2009 had to be Euro 4 equipped anyway.
6More precisely, program administration had to be covered by the budget, which implied that the actual
number of subsidized purchases was slightly lower than 2 million: 1,933,090.
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Note: The dashed line exhibits monthly new passenger car registrations (absolute level, left scale), the dashed-dotted line shows
annual CO2 emissions of newly registered passenger cars (g/km, right scale). The blue vertical line indicates the beginning of the
German scrappage program.
Figure 1: Monthly Registrations and Annual CO2 Emissions of New Passenger Cars in Germany
lifetime of the newly registered vehicles, separately for the different groups of buyers. This
would not be possible for alternative measures like average tons of CO2 emissions of overall
passenger cars. Moreover, such alternatives mostly feature a shorter time horizon as well as
an undesirable signal-to-noise ratio, as we are solely interested in differences induced by the
scrappage program, which affected only a rather small subgroup of cars.
Figure 1 displays the development of our variables of interest from 2004 to 2012.7 Overall,
new car registrations were quite stable over the years 2004 till 2008, with about 270,000
registrations per month and very consistent seasonalities. Nevertheless, one can see a slightly
positive development from the beginning of 2004 until the end of 2006 and, from then on,
a crisis-induced decline until the end of 2008. In 2009, eventually, there was a striking jump
up to more than 400,000 monthly new car registrations. One year later, this number dropped
back to a little less than its regular 2004–2008 level (240,000 vs. 270,000), featuring a dip
which, however, seems to be much smaller than the spike in 2009. Afterwards, once again,
there is a positive development of new passenger car registrations until the end of 2012. Our
second dependent variable, average CO2 emissions of newly registered passenger cars, shows
7In graphics, we use the following convention: when plotting monthly series, values are attributed to the
15th of the corresponding month and then connected by an interpolating straight line. Analogously, annual
values are attributed to July 1st of the corresponding year.
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a considerable decline of about 11 grams per kilometer during the intervention period. This is
by far the biggest drop throughout our observation window with a yearly emission decline of
about 2.5 g/km on average over the first four years. In the following post-treatment periods
until the end of our observation frame, emissions further fall, but rather slowly.
While this descriptive depiction suggests that both of our outcomes react as intended due
to the treatment, it is not sufficient to draw any firm conclusions from it. To be able to do so
and, moreover, to disentangle potential subgroups of the overall effects, we apply a suitable
estimation strategy, which delivers reliable counterfactual values: Synthetic Control Methods
(SCM).
3 Multivariate SCM using Time Series
For calculating synthetic controls, we develop the multivariate synthetic control method using
time series (MSCMT). This method generalizes and extends the SCM approach of Abadie and
Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010) in two respects simultaneously. First, similar to
the approach of Robbins et al. (2017), MSCMT allows to consider more than one variable
of interest at a time (M dimension added to SCM), i.e., it takes account of possible inter-
dependencies between such outcomes. Second, like in Gobillon and Magnac (2016) and Xu
(2017), MSCMT allows to use entire time series of all variables (T dimension added to SCM),
while the original SCM approach is rather designed to using their means. By exploiting the
economic predictors’ entire variation over time, we efficiently use all data in order to find the
best counterfactual for Germany. Note that the two generalizations are independent of each
other: one might, depending on the application, synthesize with respect to several variables
of interest, relying only on means of the covariates, i.e., employ an MSCM approach; alterna-
tively, one might consider synthesizing with respect to only one variable of interest using time
series data of the economic predictors, i.e., employ an SCMT approach. For the case at hand,
where we consider both extensions, MSCMT provides a counterfactual Germany that mimics
actual Germany with respect to both the number of new car registrations and the average
CO2 emissions per km of newly registered cars, additionally exploiting the variation over time
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of data-chosen covariates.
Before we turn our attention to the specific application in Section 4, we formally introduce
the multivariate synthetic control method using time series, discuss theory on the estimator’s
properties, and explain how we use cross-validation in combination with synthetic control
methods.
General Model Setup
In general, synthetic control methods aim at producing an appropriate counterfactual for
the treated unit, which describes how the variables of interest would have developed if there
had been no treatment. In other words, the ultimate goal of MSCMT is to come up with
approximations Ŷk1t for Y˜k1t, with the latter denoting the counterfactual values one would
have observed for the treated unit if there had been no intervention, while Yk1t denotes the
actual value of the k-th variable of interest for the treated unit at some post-treatment time
t. The true but unknown effect of the intervention on the k-th variable of interest at post-
treatment times t, which is given by
Effk,t := Yk1t − Y˜k1t, (1)
is then approximated by
Êffk,t := Yk1t − Ŷk1t. (2)
The error in estimating the intervention’s effect, Êffk,t − Effk,t, coincides with Y˜k1t − Ŷk1t.
Thus, it is essential that Ŷk1t is a good approximation to Y˜k1t. For constructing Ŷk1t, data
from J so-called donor units are used, which are to some extent similar to the treated unit
but have not been exposed to the intervention. These donor units are combined to form
a so-called synthetic control unit, which serves as an approximation for the treated unit’s
counterfactual development. For determining the synthetic control unit, one uses non-negative
weights w2, . . . , wJ+1, which sum up to unity and are collected in a J-dimensional vector
W = (w2, . . . , wJ+1)′. In our application, we have J = 11, and w2 will be denoting the weight
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of Belgium and w12 that of Sweden.8 Given such weights W , the counterfactual values of the
dependent variables for the treated unit, Y˜k1t, are approximated by
Ŷk1t(W ) :=
J+1∑
j=2
wjYkjt. (3)
As stated above, the approximation aims at Ŷk1t(W ) being close to the counterfactual
values Y˜k1t for post-treatment times t. One therefore would like to choose the weights W such
that the post-treatment approximation error Y˜k1t− Ŷk1t(W ) is minimized. Unfortunately, this
is not operational, as the counterfactual values Y˜k1t are unknown. In their seminal papers,
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010) have introduced a principle which is
operational and can be shown to produce reasonable estimators: instead of trying to minimize
post-treatment differences between outcome variables of the synthetic control and unavailable
counterfactual outcome values Y˜k1t, one aims at minimizing pre-treatment differences between
actual outcome values Yk1t and synthetic outcome values Ŷk1t(W ) as well as pre-treatment
differences between actual and synthetic values of covariates.9 The covariates are variables
which have predictive power for the outcomes of interest and which we allow to be time-
varying (T dimension added to SCM). Thus, we will in the sequel denote by Cl1t the actual
pre-treatment value of the l-th covariate for the treated unit at time t, by Cljt the actual pre-
treatment value of the l-th covariate for the j-th unit at time t, and by Ĉl1t(W ) :=
J+1∑
j=2
wjCljt
the pre-treatment value of the l-th covariate for the synthetic control unit at time t.
In contrast to Gobillon and Magnac (2016) and Xu (2017), who also use time-varying
covariates, we do not use post-treatment values of these variables. This would only be justi-
fied if the covariates’ actual and counterfactual post-treatment values coincide, an (implicit)
assumption that we do not want to make for the case of the German scrappage program. For
instance, we use GDP as a covariate,10 and as the rebate aimed at stabilizing the car market
8As is standard in the literature on SCM, we also use the terms “donors”, “donor units”, and ”control
units” for the countries that can potentially be used to synthesize Germany. Taken together, all those control
units make up the so-called “donor pool”. For standard assumptions concerning the donor pool, see Abadie
et al. (2015). Analogously, we also call Germany the “treated unit”.
9Note that this principle, which is standard in the SCM context, implicitly assumes that actual and coun-
terfactual pre-treatment values coincide, both for the outcome variables as well as for the covariates.
10We will elaborate on our set of predictors in detail in Section 4.
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by incentivizing owners of clunkers to buy new cars, the intervention might potentially have
affected GDP post-treatment.
Overall, the multivariate synthetic control method using time series thus consists of match-
ing the pre-treatment values of the outcome variables, Ŷk1t(W ), to the corresponding values
Yk1t, and matching the pre-treatment values of the covariates, Ĉl1t(W ), to the corresponding
values Cl1t. For estimating the effect of the intervention, we use Êffk,t(W ) := Yk1t−Ŷk1t(W ) for
post-treatment time points t. Combining equations (1), (2), and (3), the error in estimating
the true effect Effk,t is then found to be
Êffk,t(W )− Effk,t = Y˜k1t −
J+1∑
j=2
wjYkjt. (4)
Properties of the MSCMT estimator
For studying the properties of the MSCMT estimator under different data generating pro-
cesses, we first introduce some notation: for every unit (j = 1, . . . , J + 1), we denote by
Xj,t := (Y1jt, . . . , YKjt, C1jt, . . . , CLjt)′
the (M := K + L)-dimensional stacked vector consisting of the outcomes of interest’s actual
values (first K elements of X) and the corresponding actual values of the covariates (last L
elements of X) at pre-treatment time t. Similarly, for post-treatment times t, we denote by
X1,t :=
(
Y˜11t, . . . , Y˜K1t, C˜1t, . . . , C˜L1t
)′
, Xj,t := (Y1jt, . . . , YKjt, C1jt, . . . , CLjt)′ (j = 2, . . . , J+1)
the corresponding vector of the treated unit’s counterfactual and the donor units’ actual values
at time t. Therefore, Xj,t describes how outcomes and covariates would have evolved in absence
of the intervention.11
For given weights W = (w2, . . . , wJ+1)′, we denote by et(W ) := X1,t −
J+1∑
j=2
wjXj,t the M -
11Recall that it is implicitly assumed that the actual pre-treatment values of outcomes and covariates are
identical to the corresponding counterfactual ones. Thus, it is essential that the intervention could not be
anticipated. Additionally, one builds on the implicit assumption that, at any time, the donor units’ values are
not affected by the intervention.
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dimensional approximation error at time t induced by the weights W . For pre-treatment times
t, et(W ) consists of K components which give the errors when approximating the treated unit’s
actual outcome values, and L components which describe the corresponding approximation
errors with respect to the covariates. For post-treatment times t, we find
et(W ) =
(
Y˜11t, . . . , Y˜K1t, C˜1t, . . . , C˜L1t
)′ − J+1∑
j=2
wj (Y1jt, . . . , YKjt, C1jt, . . . , CLjt)′ . (5)
Due to Equation (4), the first K components of et(W ) coincide with the estimation errors of
the effect estimators.
In order to study the properties of et(W ), we further denote by A˜0,t, . . . , A˜p,t possibly time-
varying (M ×M)-dimensional coefficient matrices and by ε˜j,t an M -dimensional error term,
while δ˜t denotes an M -dimensional common trend. We assume that, for every unit j, Xj,t is
given by a vector autoregression of order p plus the common trend δ˜t:
Xj,t =
p∑
h=0
A˜h,tXj,t−h + δ˜t + ε˜j,t = A˜0,tXj,t + . . .+ A˜p,tXj,t−p + δ˜t + ε˜j,t,
for which I − A˜0,t is invertible for all t, with I denoting the M -dimensional identity matrix.
The above equation can then be rewritten as
Xj,t =
(
I − A˜0,t
)−1 ( p∑
h=1
A˜h,tXj,t−h + δ˜t + ε˜j,t
)
=
p∑
h=1
Ah,tXj,t−h + δt + εj,t, (6)
with Ah,t :=
(
I − A˜0,t
)−1
A˜h,t, δt :=
(
I − A˜0,t
)−1
δ˜t, and εj,t :=
(
I − A˜0,t
)−1
ε˜j,t. For et(W ),
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the derivation
et(W ) = X1,t −
J+1∑
j=2
wjXj,t
=
p∑
h=1
Ah,tX1,t−h + δt + ε1,t −
J+1∑
j=2
wj
( p∑
h=1
Ah,tXj,t−h + δt + εj,t
)
=
p∑
h=1
Ah,t
X1,t−h − J+1∑
j=2
wjXj,t−h
+ δt
1− J+1∑
j=2
wj
+ ε1,t − J+1∑
j=2
wjεj,t
=
p∑
h=1
Ah,tet−h(W ) + ε1,t −
J+1∑
j=2
wjεj,t.
(7)
shows that et(W ) is composed of two terms: an autoregression of order p and the noise-like
term ε1,t −
J+1∑
j=2
wjεj,t. The latter term has expectation zero for post-treatment times t and
is characterized by a positive variance which, due to the presence of ε1,t, cannot be made
arbitrarily small by cleverly choosing donor weights W—even for a large number of donor
units. Therefore,
p∑
h=1
Ah,tet−h(W ), the autoregressive part of et(W ), is the decisive one with
respect to choosing W : if the donor weights W are such that the approximation errors et(W )
are annihilated or at least close to 0 immediately before the treatment, the estimation errors
of the effect estimators will essentially consist of the unavoidable part ε1,t −
J+1∑
j=2
wjεj,t. More
formally, the following proposition can be stated, which generalizes the result (5) of Abadie
et al. (2010, p. 496) from a univariate autoregressive process of order 1 to a multivariate
autoregressive process of order p.
Proposition 1. Denoting by T0 the time of the intervention, we have:
1. the bias of the vector of effect estimators, (Y11t − Ŷ11t(W ), . . . , YK1t − ŶK1t(W ))′, condi-
tional on FT0, the information up to time T0, is a linear function of the p approximation
errors eT0(W ), . . . , eT0−(p−1)(W ),
2. if T0 ≥ p and the weights W ∗ = (w∗2, . . . , w∗J+1) satisfy X1,t =
J+1∑
j=2
w∗jXj,t for t =
T0, . . . , T0 − (p − 1), then E(et(W )|FT0) = 0 for all t ≥ T0 + 1, and the vector of
effect estimators is unbiased.
Proof. See Appendix A.
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From Proposition 1 we learn that a perfect fit of the last p observations of the outcomes
and covariates prior to the treatment renders the vector of effect estimators unbiased, i.e.,
the effects on all outcomes are estimated without bias. Furthermore, the first part of the
proposition shows that the better the approximations of outcomes and covariates are prior to
the treatment, the smaller a potential bias of the effect estimators will be.
We will now consider the more general case, which allows for time-varying, unobserved
confounders to be present, too, leading to an additional term
uj,t :=
(
λ1,tµ1,j, . . . , λM,tµM,j
)′
,
with λm,t ∈ R1×Fm describing the values of the Fm unobserved confounders affecting the m-
th component of the stacked vector X, and µm,j ∈ RFm×1 denoting the corresponding factor
loadings of unit j. All in all, we thus assume that the stacked vector of outcomes and covariates,
X, is given by
Xj,t =
p∑
h=1
Ah,tXj,t−h + δt + uj,t + εj,t = A1,tXj,t−1 + . . .+ Ap,tXj,t−p + δt + uj,t + εj,t.
In this more general setting, formula (7) generalizes to
et(W ) =
p∑
h=1
Ah,tet−h(W ) + u1,t −
J+1∑
j=2
wjuj,t + ε1,t −
J+1∑
j=2
wjεj,t. (8)
and, hence, et(w) contains the additional term
u1,t −
J+1∑
j=2
wjuj,t =
λ1,t(µ1,1 − J+1∑
j=2
wjµ1,j
)
, . . . , λM,t
(
µM,1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjµM,j
)′ ,
which might render the effect estimators biased, as there is no guarantee that the approxima-
tions
J+1∑
j=2
wjµm,j are close to the unobservable factor loadings µm,1. However, generalizing the
result (1) of Abadie et al. (2010, p. 495), the following proposition shows that a potential bias
of the effect estimators will shrink to zero when the pre-treatment time span grows large.
Proposition 2. In the presence of unobserved confounders, if W ∗ is such that X1,t =
14
J+1∑
j=2
w∗jXj,t for t = 1, . . . , T0, the vector of effect estimators is asymptotically unbiased un-
der some technical assumptions12, i.e., the bias vanishes when the pre-treatment time span
grows to infinity.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Overall, for both data generating processes considered above, the MSCMT estimators
provide good estimators for measuring the intervention’s effects, at least as long as a sufficiently
large number of pre-treatment observations of both outcomes and covariates are close to each
other for the actually treated and the corresponding synthetic control unit.
MSCMT Predictor Weights by Cross-Validation
While it is clear from the theory outlined above that the donor weights W should ideally be
chosen such that the synthetic control unit comes as close as possible to the actually treated
unit in terms of pre-treatment values of outcome variables and covariates, it remains unclear
how this should be operationalized. Typically, it will be impossible to obtain a perfect fit
for all so-called economic predictors, i.e., for the pre-treatment values of all outcomes and
covariates. Thus, a weighting scheme is needed, which determines how much weight is put on
each predictor when matching them. When determining such predictor weights, it must be
taken into account that some variables might have more predictive power for the outcomes
than others, or that some of them might even have no predictive power at all, having been
added to the model just to make sure that no potentially important predictors are omitted.13
Therefore, so-called predictor weights V = (v1, . . . , vM) are introduced, where each vm acts as a
weight describing how much emphasis should be put on fitting the m-th predictor variable. For
determining these weights from the data, we slightly generalize the cross-validation technique
introduced by Abadie et al. (2015) and refined by Klo¨ßner et al. (2018) and Becker et al.
(2018).
12For details on the technical assumptions, see Appendix A.
13For the models discussed above, predictive power hinges on the entries of the coefficient matrices Ah,t. For
instance, if the (k,m)-entry of A1,T0 is large, then Equations (7) and (8) entail that errors in approximating
Xm1T0 immediately translate into large errors in estimating Effk,T0+1.
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The principal idea of the cross-validation technique is to split up the pre-treatment time
span into two disjoint parts, the ’training period’ and the ’validation period’, with the former
preceding the latter. The training period’s data on the economic predictors is used to deter-
mine, for any given predictor weights V , donor weights W ∗train(V ), which produce the best fit
of the predictor variables in the training period. The validation period’s data on the outcome
variables is then used to assess the fit that W ∗train(V ) implies for the outcome variables, and
to search for those predictor weights V ∗ optimizing this fit.
More precisely, within the training part of the so-called cross-validation step, given any
hypothetical predictor weights V ,W ∗train(V ) is determined as the very non-negative vectorW =
(w2, . . . , wJ+1), with components summing to unity, for which
M∑
m=1
vm MSEtrainX,m (W ) becomes
minimal. Here, MSEtrainX,m (W ) denotes the appropriately scaled mean squared approximation
error that results from approximating the m-th predictor variable’s values in the training
period, Xm1t, by its synthetic counterpart
J+1∑
j=2
wjXmjt:
MSEtrainX,m (W ) :=
1
N trainm
∑
t∈Ttrain
(
Xm1t −
J+1∑
j=2
wjXmjt
)2
Var({Xmjt : j = 1, . . . , J + 1, t ∈ Ttrain}) , (9)
with N trainm denoting the number of observations of the m-th economic predictor during the
training period, Ttrain. Note that the denominator appearing in the definition of MSEtrainX,m en-
sures that the mean squared approximation errors are comparable across predictors, because
mean squared differences between actual and synthetic values are divided by the amount by
which the data on the corresponding predictor vary during the training period.14 Table 1 pro-
vides an overview over the different time periods employed by the cross-validation technique.
In the validation part of the cross-validation step, one then searches for those predictor
weights V ∗ that would have produced the smallest prediction error for the outcome variables
in the validation period. To this end, the overall prediction error of the outcome variables,
which is also called cross-validation criterion, is defined as the square root of the unweighted
14We follow the literature by using the data on all units in the denominator of Equation (9). The advantage
of this approach is that the data can be rescaled prior to all calculations and do not have to be rescaled again
when conducting placebo studies.
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Table 1: Overview over Time Periods employed by Cross-Validation Technique
cross-validation step main step
for fitting predictors Ttrain (2004–2006) Tpred (2006–2008)
for estimating outcomes Tvalid (2007–2008) Test (2009–2010)
mean of all outcomes’ mean squared (prediction) errors MSEvalidY,k (W ∗train(V )):15
∆C-VY (V ) :=
√√√√ 1
K
K∑
k=1
MSEvalidY,k (W ∗train(V )) (10)
These outcome-specific mean squared prediction errors are in turn defined as the appropriately
scaled mean squared errors resulting from approximating Yk1t, the k-th outcome variable’s
values in the validation period Tvalid, by
J+1∑
j=2
w∗train,j(V )Ykjt, their synthetic counterpart:
MSEvalidY,k (W ∗train(V )) :=
1
Nvalid
k
∑
t∈Tvalid
(
Yk1t −
J+1∑
j=2
w∗train,j(V )Ykjt
)2
Var({Ykjt : j = 1, . . . , J + 1, t ∈ Tvalid}) , (11)
with Nvalidk denoting the number of observations of the k-th outcome variable in the validation
period Tvalid.
Eventually, the optimal predictor weights V ∗ found in the cross-validation step are used
within the so-called ’main step’ for determining the final donor weights W ∗main(V ∗), which are
used to build the synthetic control unit. Using the economic predictors’ pre-treatment data
during the ’main period’ immediately prior to the intervention, W ∗main(V ∗) is calculated as
the minimizer of
M∑
m=1
v∗m MSE
pred
X,m(W ), where MSE
pred
X,m(W ) measures the fit with respect to the
predictors during the main period:
MSEpredX,m(W ) :=
1
Npredm
∑
t∈Tpred
(
Xm1t −
J+1∑
j=2
wjXmjt
)2
Var({Xmjt : j = 1, . . . , J + 1, t ∈ Tpred}) , (12)
with Npredm denoting the number of observations of the m-th economic predictor during the
economic predictors’ main period.
15One might introduce appropriate weighting schemes here in order to take account of potential differences
in the outcomes’ importance.
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In our application, the period of interest after the treatment is given by years 2009 and
2010, as the scrappage program might have induced buyers to buy new cars in 2009 and
to pull forward their purchases from 2010 to 2009 in order to profit from the subsidy. We
therefore set the validation period to years 2007 and 2008, making the validation period
mimic the estimation window we are mainly interested in. As our data start in 2004, we set
the training period to years 2004–2006 and use the cross-validation technique as described
above to determine optimal predictor weights V ∗. In order to ensure that the lengths of the
time spans used during the cross-validation step match those used during the main step, we
set the economic predictors’ main period to years 2006–2008, and employ V ∗ to compute the
donor weights W ∗main(V ∗) using the predictors’ data from 2006 to 2008.
Overall, cross-validating MSCMT—as we employ it here—thus consists of a ’test run’
of MSCMT using the predictors’ data in the training period from 2004 to 2006 to predict
the outcomes in the validation period consisting of years 2007 and 2008. Comparing these
predictions delivered by MSCMT to the corresponding actual values, the predictor weights
V ∗ are chosen optimally, i.e., such that the prediction errors are as small as possible. After this
test run, the periods are shifted two years ahead in time to Tpred = Ttrain+2 and Test = Tvalid+2
(all times measured in years), and the main run of MSCMT is carried out using the optimal
predictor weights V ∗.
4 Empirical Application of MSCMT
Model Specification
Prior to any actual calculations, we transform the outcome variables in order to make them
comparable across countries. This comparability is needed to ensure that the values for the
treated unit are within the convex hull of the donors’ values, which is important for the syn-
thetic control approach to work properly, see Gobillon and Magnac (2016).16 To this end, we
transform ’monthly new car registrations’ figures into change rates of registrations, by calcu-
lating the percentage change rate between the new registrations in a given month and corre-
16An alternative approach to potentially bypass the convex hull condition is discussed in Powell (2018).
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sponding registrations twelve months earlier. In so doing, we eliminate any country-specific
seasonality and construct a new time series which fluctuates around zero for all countries. Sim-
ilarly, the annual time series on ’average CO2 emissions of newly registered cars per kilometer
driven’ is made comparable by expressing all values as percentages relative to the emissions
at the beginning of the observation period in 2004. By this construction, emission figures take
values close to 100 for all countries.
With respect to covariates, we build on an earlier draft of this paper where we used ten vari-
ables in an MSCMT approach without cross-validation. Of the ten covariates, seven variables
broadly reflect the respective country’s economy, the vehicle market, and the environmental
periphery: annual GDP per capita (quarterly data), the unemployment rate (annual data),
two harmonized consumer price indices (Cars and Energy, monthly data), the share of passen-
ger cars on overall transportation (annual data), CO2 emissions per inhabitant (annual data),
and environmental tax revenues from the passenger transportation sector (percentage of GDP,
annual data). Three more covariates deliver individual and household specific indicators: net
earnings (PPS, annual data), annual consumption expenditures per capita (quarterly data),
and pensions per capita (annual data).17
In this paper, however, we actually use the cross-validation technique to select an optimal
subset of these covariates.18 We run the first step of the cross-validation approach, taking as
potential set of covariates each of the 1,024 subsets of the ten variables in turn, and calculate
the corresponding cross-validation criterion defined in Equation (10).19 Delivering the smallest
cross-validation criterion, ∆C-VY (V ) = 0.0464957, the specification with CO2 emissions per
inhabitant, environmental tax revenues from the passenger transportation sector, and GDP
as covariates emerges as the winner of our specification search.20
This specification in particular outperforms the specification without covariates, as the
17All variables are EUROSTAT data, running from 2004 until 2008.
18Specification searches without objective selection criteria and their sensitivity to “cherry picking” are
discussed in Ferman et al. (2017).
19For all calculations, we use the statistical software R (R Core Team, 2018) in combination with package
MSCMT (Becker and Klo¨ßner, 2018b), as other software on synthetic control methods has been found to be
not always reliable, see Becker and Klo¨ßner (2017) and Becker and Klo¨ßner (2018a).
20Note that models with a small set of covariates are not nested in models with a larger set of covariates,
as predictor weights must be restricted away from zero both for theoretical as well as for numerical reasons,
see Becker and Klo¨ßner (2018a).
19
latter is characterized by ∆C-VY (V ) = 0.05771181, an increase of about 24% in the root mean
squared prediction error in the validation period as compared to the optimal specification.21
Furthermore, the 1,024 MSCM model variants—where the predictors’ averages are used in-
stead of treating them as time series—also perform much worse than the optimal specification,
with the best of these delivering ∆C-VY (V ) = 0.05150044. Thus, they perform substantially
worse than the models using the entire time series variation.22 All subsequent analyses will
therefore be carried out using MSCMT and the winner specification consisting of the three
covariates mentioned above.
Estimation Results
The cross-validation technique finds the following predictor weighting scheme to be opti-
mal with respect to the cross-validation criterion: 0.0000693 for the registration change rate,
0.69297 for CO2 emissions of newly registered cars, 0.29010 for CO2 emissions per inhabi-
tant, 0.015653 for GDP, and 0.0012148 for environmental tax revenues from the passenger
transportation sector. Employing these predictor weights, the donor weights for synthesizing
Germany in the main step are as follows: Belgium 68.02%, Czech Republic 3.72%, Estonia
6.39%, Finland 0.095%, Poland 5.33%, and Sweden 16.46%; the remainder of the donor pool
receives weights of zero, respectively. Using these donor weights to build the synthetic Ger-
many, we can calculate counterfactual timelines for our outcome variables.
The left panel of Figure 2 displays the timelines of the new car registrations’ change rates
of actual Germany and its synthetic counterpart. The figure shows that in 2008, immediately
prior to the intervention, actual and counterfactual change rates of registrations are quite
close to each other, while as compared to their synthetic counterpart, actual change rates are
considerably larger during 2009 and smaller during 2010. These effects can be explained as
follows: while registration figures were stable during 2008, the scrappage premium induced
an increase in new car registrations in 2009, leading to largely positive change rates in 2009.
21SCM cases without covariates, also called “constrained regressions”, are discussed and applied in, e.g.,
Botosaru and Ferman (2017), Chernozhukov et al. (2017), Doudchenko and Imbens (2016), Kaul et al. (2015),
Powell (2017), and Powell (2018).
22When using averages, Formulas (9) and (12) change with respect to the order of taking means and squares.
Precisely, means of variables are calculated first and only then differences are squared.
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Note: Left panel: comparison of actual (black, solid) and synthetic (red, dashed) values of new registrations’ change rate for
Germany. Middle & right panel: differences between actual and synthetic values of new registrations’ change rate for Germany
during estimation window (middle) and evaluation window (right).
Figure 2: New Passenger Car Registration Results for Germany: Gap Plots using Cross-Validation
With respect to 2010, two effects were at work which both led to considerably negative values
for the change rate of registrations. On the one hand, the 2009 registration figures were larger
due to the intervention, which itself leads to negative change rates in 2010—even if the 2010
figures were ’normal’, i.e., not influenced by the Cash-for-Clunkers program. On the other
hand, registration figures in 2010 might have additionally been reduced by the intervention,
because purchases were pulled forward from 2010 to 2009 in order to profit from the scrappage
premium. Thus, one cannot easily infer whether the negative actual change rates in 2010 are
driven only by additional purchases that happened in 2009, only by pull-forward purchases,
or by both effects. We will tackle the problem of disentangling such potential mechanisms in
Section 5 below.
The middle panel of Figure 2 plots the difference between actual and counterfactual change
rates of registrations in the main, post-intervention estimation window from 2009 to 2010.
This so-called gap plot shows that, during 2009, the effect of the intervention on the new
registrations’ change rate was largely positive, partially taking values well above 50 percentage
points. This indicates that, for some months, absolute actual registration figures towered over
counterfactual ones by more than half of the corresponding amount in 2008. Similarly, we find
considerably large negative gaps during 2010. Although these gaps in change rates are quite
impressive, one might wonder whether these differences might still be explained by random
variation. In the right panel of Figure 2, we therefore contrast these gaps with the analogous
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Note: Left & middle panel: differences between actual and synthetic values of new registrations’ change rate for Germany (magenta,
solid) and placebos (gray, dashed) during estimation window (left) and validation window (middle). Right panel: gaps in estimation
window relative to average gap size in validation window.
Figure 3: New Passenger Car Registration Results for Germany: Gap-Plots using Cross-Validation incl. Placebos
gaps obtained for the validation period. As the latter take rather small absolute values close
to zero, we have first evidence that the intervention caused the change rates to take larger
values in 2009 and smaller values in 2010.
In order to further explore the significance of the gaps in the main estimation window, Fig-
ure 3 repeats parts of Figure 2, additionally showing so-called placebos results for inference. In
the context of SCM, a growing number of rather informal inferential techniques have emerged,
which are all rooted in the framework of permutation tests (see, e.g., Abadie et al., 2010, 2015;
Ferman and Pinto, 2017; Firpo and Possebom, 2017). Using a placebo study, the treatment
is reassigned to a comparison unit, meaning that the actually treated unit, Germany, moves
into the donor pool while one of the control units is synthesized instead.23 Applying this
idea to each country from the original donor pool allows to compare the estimated effect of
the German program to the distribution of placebo effects obtained for other countries. One
can consider the effect of the program to be significant if the estimated impact for Germany
is (absolutely) large relative to the outcome distribution of adequately synthesized placebo
units. After the treatment-cutoff, Germany’s impact on new registrations’ change rates clearly
stands out of the bulk of control units, featuring an evidently significant treatment effect (left
panel of Figure 3). In contrast, Germany’s pre-treatment prediction error in the validation
window (middle panel of Figure 3) is completely covered by a band consisting of the placebo
23However, our subsequent placebo results do not depend on Germany being included in the donor pool.
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countries’ results.
A last test is presented in the right panel of Figure 3. Here, we divide the country-specific
monthly values of the left panel of Figure 3 by the average cross-validation RMSPE of the
corresponding country as plotted in the middle panel of Figure 3.24 More precisely, we scale
the (monthly) result of the post-intervention period by the (average) precision of the out-of-
sample-prediction in the validation period. This is a sensible procedure since a large (placebo)
treatment effect is meaningless if the prediction error in the validation period between the
respective unit and its synthetic control is large, too. Hence, we deflate the treatment effect
of those countries that show a rather imprecise out-of-sample result in the validation window,
while we inflate the treatment effect in case of a good prediction for the validation period.
Again, Germany stands out of the mass of placebos, clearly featuring a significant impact.
In particular, the relative gaps are close to 10 in absolute value, which shows that the esti-
mated treatment effect (for some months) is almost ten times as large as the pre-intervention
out-of-sample prediction error in the validation period. All in all, our confidence that Ger-
many’s sizable synthetic control estimate actually reflects the effect of the scrappage stimulus
is strengthened since no similar or larger estimates arose when the treatment was artificially
re-assigned to units not exposed to the intervention.
With respect to CO2 pollution, Figure 4 reveals that the point estimates for the treatment
effect show a decline in emissions of the average newly registered car in 2009 by about 2.5%
(of 2004 emissions), and an increase of about 1.25% in 2010. However, these effects are rather
small when compared to the corresponding placebo results, and they also do not appear to be
large in absolute value when compared to the corresponding out-of-sample prediction errors
in the validation period. The insignificance of the CO2 results also remains true if we consider
the relative gaps, i.e., when we scale the result of the post-intervention period by the average
precision of the predictions for the validation period.
In a final step throughout the next section, we formally disentangle our measured effects,
focusing on new passenger car registrations and mostly abstracting from corresponding CO2
24This approach is similar in spirit to the ratios of post- over pre-treatment RMSPE employed by Abadie
et al. (2015).
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Figure 4: CO2 Emission Results for Germany: Gap-Plots using Cross-Validation incl. Placebos
emissions, due to the (in)significance of our former findings.
5 Disentangling the MSCMT Effects
The Long-Run Impact and Time-Shifting of Sales
Figure 5 shows how the results on the registrations’ change rates translate into absolute
numbers of registrations.25 The figure’s left panel, which displays the actual and counterfactual
timelines of new car registrations, reveals that actual registration figures in 2009 were much
larger than their synthetic counterpart, showing that the intervention led to a huge increase
in registrations in the first year. Contrarily, actual registration figures in 2010 are somewhat
below their synthetic counterpart, indicating that some buyers did not purchase new cars in
2010, although they would have done so in the absence of the intervention. These buyers pulled
their purchases forward to 2009 in order to pocket the scrappage premium. The same effect
can also be seen from the middle and right panel of Figure 5, which yield the ’gaps’ between
actual and synthetic registration figures, i.e., the difference between actual and counterfactual
numbers of registrations, and their cumulation over time, Êffcum(t) :=
∑
τ∈[2009−01,t]
Êff1,τ which
25As this section mainly focuses on registrations, one might estimate an SCMT model for registrations only.
We refrain from doing so, as the corresponding result only marginally deviates from the MSCMT result when
the set of predictors is left unchanged.
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Figure 5: New Passenger Car Registrations Results for Germany: Transition from MSCMT Results to Cumulated Gap Results
is an estimate of the cumulated effect on registrations, Effcum(t) :=
∑
τ∈[2009−01,t]
Eff1,τ .
One can see from the figure that the gaps are positive during 2009, while they become
negative during 2010, and that the positive difference in 2009 is much larger than the negative
one in the next period. Correspondingly, the cumulated gaps drastically increase during 2009,
while they decrease much less in 2010, until they stabilize at a level of approximately 850,000 at
the end of that year. Therefore, it is evident that the long-run effect of the intervention consists
of approximately 850,000 sales, which would not have been realized in the absence of a Cash-
for-Clunkers program (on-top sales). Note that this is quite different from the U.S. case, for
which the literature finds that 100% of program-induced purchases happened on cost of future
periods (see, e.g., Mian and Sufi, 2012), resulting in a vanishing long-run impact. In our case,
however, the positive overall long-term effect of the scrappage premium is actually significant.
Figure 6 shows that Germany’s cumulated gaps per capita are significantly above those of the
placebo countries, especially when relating them to the root mean squared prediction error in
the validation period.
At its peak in late 2009, the cumulated effect was even close to 1.16 million cars, implying
that there was also a strong pull-forward effect, which can be roughly read off as the peak minus
the long run value. Visual inspection suggests that the scrappage program led to a decrease
of approximately 310,000 purchases between late 2009 and December 2010. Yet, we have to
take into consideration that the intervention did not only incentivize people to pull forward
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Figure 6: Cumulated Sales Effect of German Scrappage Program
purchases, but also that it potentially shifted demand for non-subsidized (or “regular”) cars
from the program period to later times. In fact, car dealers report that, during the peak of the
program period, demand was so strong that people sometimes would have had to accept long
waiting times with lines ranging until outside the dealerships. Additionally, empirical evidence
shows that throughout the program period non-subsidized buyers were price discriminated
against when purchasing large, i.e. expensive, cars compared with subsidized people (see Kaul
et al., 2016). Therefore, potential car buyers, not being eligible for the subsidy but aware of
such facts, might have decided to delay their purchases until the policy intervention had ended.
All in all, the program therefore implied two different effects with respect to shifting demand
in time, which partially offset each other. On the one hand, people pulling forward their
purchases in order to profit from the scrappage premium. On the other hand, people delaying
their regular purchase until the program had run off. The above mentioned difference of ca.
310,000 purchases therefore equals the difference between pull-forward and delayed purchases.
Without disentangling these two effects, we can only conclude that at least 310,000 purchases
were pulled forward and that at most 770,000 (≈ 1,933,000-850,000-310,000) people profited
from windfall gains, since they had intended to buy a new car anyway.
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A Non-Linear Model
In order to estimate the amounts of pull-forward and delayed purchases, we build a non-linear
model to describe the timeline of the program’s cumulated effect as shown in Figure 5’s right
panel. First of all, we measure the time elapsed in months since 2009-01-01, and consider time
points t ∈ [0, 32], corresponding to the time span from January 2009 through August 2011.26
By introducing the parameter 0 ≤ t0, which describes the start of the intervention’s effect on
registrations, we allow for some delay between the official start of the program and its taking
effect on registrations. Similarly, we employ t1 (≥ t0) to denote the point in time when the
effect of on-top sales on registration figures ends.
We model by Eff(o)(t) := κ0
t1 − t
t1 − t0 +κ1
t− t0
t1 − t0 for t0 ≤ t ≤ t1 the rate of on-top (additional)
purchases during the program’s lifetime. Here, κ0 and κ1 denote the rates at which on-top
registrations occur at the program’s start and end, respectively. The timeline of Eff(o)(t) is
given in the left panel of Figure 7.27 The cumulated effect of on-top purchases, Eff(o)cum :=
t∫
0
Eff(o)(τ)dτ , can be written as
Eff(o)cum = β(o) l˜int0,t1 + (κ0 − κ1) q˜uadt0,t1 ,
with β(o) := t1−t02 (κ0 + κ1) denoting the overall amount of additional purchases
28. The corre-
sponding timeline is given by the blue, dotted line in the right panel of Figure 7.
With respect to pull-forward sales, we denote by t4 the furthest point in time from which
purchases were pulled forward, and by sh(p)(s, t) the rate of pulling forward from time s to time
t. More precisely, for small time spans ∆s and ∆t, we assume that the amount of purchases
pulled forward from [s, s + ∆s] to [t, t + ∆t] is approximately given by sh(p)(s, t) · ∆s · ∆t.
Pulling forward takes place only for t0 ≤ t ≤ t1 ≤ s ≤ t4, and we model it by sh(p)(s, t) :=
26We discard later observations because the effects of the program can safely be expected to have worn off
in September 2011 due to institutional reasons discussed below (Subsection ’Effects on Sales’). However, the
results of our analysis do not change when using all 48 months.
27All graphics relate to the parameters as estimated by our model.
28For q < r, we denote by l˜inq,r the piecewise linear function which takes the value 0 to the left of q and the
value 1 to the right of r. Similarly, q˜uadq,r is defined as the piecewise quadratic function vanishing outside of
[q, r] with local maximum r−q8 at
q+r
2 . Formally, l˜inq,r(t) =
t−q
r−q and q˜uadq,r(t) =
1
2
(t−q)(r−t)
r−q for q ≤ t ≤ r.
27
µ(p) + λ(p) (t4 − t0)− λ(p) (s− t). Thereby, µ(p) ≥ 0 gives the rate of pull-forward sales for the
maximal time lag between s and t (s− t = t4− t0), while λ(p) ≥ 0 describes by how much the
amount of pulling forward decreases with increasing time lag s− t. The term −λ(p) (s− t) is
included to capture a potential decrease in the rate of pulling forward due to increased costs
of this shifting in time with increasing time span of pulling forward. The rate of pull-forward
sales, sh(p), is visualized as the green, dashed line in the middle panel of Figure 7, for the
special case of λ(p) = 0.29 Denoting by Eff(p)(t) :=
32∫
0
(
sh(p)(s, t)− sh(p)(t, s)
)
ds the net effect
of pull-forward sales at time t, we find for the cumulated effect of pull-forward purchases,
Eff(p)cum(t) :=
t∫
0
Eff(p)(τ)dτ :30
Eff(p)cum = β(p) lint0,t1,t4 −λ(p) quadt0,t1,t4 ,
with β(p) := (t4 − t1) (t1 − t0)
(
µ(p) + λ(p) t1−t02
)
denoting the overall amount of pull-forward
purchases. The corresponding timeline is given as the green, dashed line in the right panel of
Figure 7.
For the group of people who delayed their purchases due to the scrappage program, we
assume that they initially wanted to buy in [t0, t2], and that their delayed purchases were
rectified during [t2, t3]. We expect that t1 ≤ t2, since these buyers postponed their purchases
until the hype about Cash-for-Clunkers had worn off. We further expect that t3 ≤ t4, since
the scrappage premium was a rather strong monetary incentive to pull forward purchases that
would have happened much later without such a subsidy, while people delaying their purchases
due to the intervention had no more incentive for postponing further after the program had
ended.
To model the delaying of purchases, we denote by sh(d)(s, t) the rate of shifting from
time s to time t. Delaying only takes place for t0 ≤ s ≤ t2, and delayed sales happen at
29Footnote 27 also applies here.
30For q < r < s, linq,r,s denotes the piecewise linear function which takes the value 1 at r and vanishes
outside of [q, s]: for q ≤ t ≤ r, it takes the value t−qr−q , while it equals s−ts−r for r ≤ t ≤ s. Similarly, quadq,r,s
is defined as the piecewise quadratic function vanishing outside of [q, s] with local minima of − (r−q)2(s−r)8
and − (q−r)(r−s)28 at q+r2 and r+s2 , respectively. Formally, quadq,r,s(t) is defined as − 12 (s− r)(t− q)(r − t) for
q ≤ t ≤ r, and as − 12 (r − q)(t− r)(s− t) for r ≤ t ≤ s.
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t2 ≤ t ≤ t3. For such s, t, we assume that the rate of delaying is given by sh(d)(s, t) :=
µ(d) + λ(d) (t3 − t0) − λ(d) (t− s), where µ(d) ≥ 0 gives the rate of delaying for the maximal
time lag between s and t, t3 − t0, while λ(d) ≥ 0 describes by how much the rate of delaying
decreases when the time lag t − s increases. Intuitively, we subtract the term λ(d) (t− s)
since it is costly to postpone one’s purchase: the larger the time difference, the less likely it
becomes to delay a purchase to time t, which, without the scrappage program, would have
happened at time s. The rate of delaying, sh(d), is visualized as the grey, dashed-dotted line
in the middle panel of Figure 7. The net effect of delayed purchases at time t, given by
Eff(d)(t) :=
32∫
0
(
sh(d)(s, t)− sh(d)(t, s)
)
ds, can be used to calculate the cumulated effect of
delayed purchases at time t: Eff(d)cum(t) :=
t∫
0
Eff(d)(τ)dτ . Straightforward calculations show that
Eff(d)cum(t) can be written as follows:
Eff(d)cum = −β(d) lint0,t2,t3 +λ(d) quadt0,t2,t3 ,
with β(d) := (t3 − t2) (t2 − t0)
(
µ(d) + λ(d) t3−t02
)
denoting the overall amount of delayed pur-
chases. The corresponding timeline is given by the grey, dashed-dotted line in the right panel
of Figure 7.
All in all, we arrive at the following model for the scrappage program’s cumulated effect
on registrations, Effcum := Eff(o)cum + Eff(p)cum + Eff(d)cum:31
Effcum = β(o) l˜int0,t1 + β(p) lint0,t1,t4 −β(d) lint0,t2,t3
+ (κ0 − κ1)q˜uadt0,t1 − λ(p) quadt0,t1,t4 +λ(d) quadt0,t2,t3 . (13)
Effects on Sales
Equation (13), a function of the parameters t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, κ0, κ1, µ(p), λ(p), µ(d), λ(d), is non-
linear in t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, and linear in the others. These quantities are restricted by 0 ≤ t0 ≤
t1 ≤ t2 ≤ t3 ≤ t4, as well as by κ0, κ1, µ(p), λ(p), µ(d), λ(d) ≥ 0. For estimating these parameters,
31Note that there is no timeline for the effect of windfall gains, as these happen under both the actual and
counterfactual scenario, implying a net effect of zero.
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Figure 7: Cumulated On-Top, Pull-Forward, Delayed, and Overall Program-Induced Sales
we approximate Effcum by Êffcum and apply non-linear least squares, with Êffcum(t) denoting
the cumulated differences between actual and synthetic Germany as defined above and plotted
in the right panel of Figure 5. The corresponding results are presented in the right panel of
Figure 7 and Table 2.
Denoting the residuals from the non-linear estimation by Êffcum, the estimation yields
a root mean square error between Êffcum and Êffcum of roughly 12,000 cars. Thus, the fit
provided by the non-linear model is quite good. This can also be seen from the right panel of
Figure 7, where the cumulated effect derived from the MSCMT results (magenta, solid line) is
precisely approximated by the fitted values of the non-linear model (black, long-dashed line).
With respect to the time points, we find that program-induced registrations started mid-
February, 2009 (t0 = 1.53), while the effect ended in late November, 2009 (t1 = 10.74).
The delayed (non-subsidized) purchases started to be rectified shortly after, between mid-
December, 2009, and early August, 2010 (t2 = 11.58, t3 = 19.33). Furthermore, the scrappage
premium resulted in pull-forward purchases which otherwise would have been realized up to
the very end of 2010 (t4 = 24.04). Thus, purchases have been pulled forward over a time span
of almost exactly two years (t4 − t0 = 22.51 months), with purchases that were originally
planned for as late as December 2010, but realized already in early 2009. The finding of this
time span being two years is very plausible, since it precisely reflects specific requirements
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Table 2: Results of Non-Linear Model
Quantity Estimate Quantity Estimate
t0 1.53 µ(p) 4,485.68
t1 10.74 λ(p) 0.00
t2 11.58 µ(d) 0.00
t3 19.33 λ(d) 373.47
t4 24.04 β(o) 853,864
κ0 156,213.38 β(p) 549,579
κ1 29,220.00 β(d) 258,975
κ0 − κ1 126,993.38 β(w) 529,647
Note: Superscripts p, d, o, and w stand for the sales groups of pull-forward, delayed, on-top, and windfall, respectively. Time
points t0, t1, t2, t3, t4 are measured in months elapsed since 2009-01-01 and denote the start and end time of on-top sales, the
start and end times of delaying, and the end time of pulling forward, respectively. κ0 and κ1 denote the arrival rate of on-top
sales at the program’s start and end, respectively. µ gives the rate of delaying and pulling forward at the maximal time lags,
t3 − t0 and t4 − t0, respectively. λ denotes by how much the rates of delaying and pulling forward decrease with increasing
time lag, respectively, while β denotes the overall amounts of on-top, pull-forward, delayed, and windfall sales, respectively.
that car holders must meet in Germany: after an initial period of three years following the
initial vehicle purchase, passenger cars must be presented for inspection at officially approved
facilities every two years (similar to the MOT test in the UK). Without passing such an
inspection, cars must not be used on public roads. Especially when running an old vehicle,
these inspections are typically quite costly, as they usually involve replacing or repairing some
parts of the car. Thus, people who planned to continue driving their old car for more than two
years either owned a vehicle for which they anticipated no or only small costs of replacing and
repairing in 2009 or 2010, or they owned a vehicle for which investing into it was economically
sensible. In both cases, the old car’s worth probably exceeded e 2,500, so that it did not make
sense to scrap it off.
For the group of on-top sales, i.e., purchases only happening due to the intervention, we find
that they were realized at a rate of roughly 155,000 per month at the start of the program (κ0).
At the end of the program, however, this rate had dropped to an estimate of roughly 29,000
per month (κ1). This translates into an estimate of approximately 850,000 sales induced by
the scrappage program (β(o)), completely in line with the results obtained by visual inspection
of Figure 5’s right panel and discussed above. Extrapolating those program induced on-top
purchases by using the mean price for German cars bought under the scrappage program
(e 20,000 according to BAFA, 2010) implies a notable multiplier effect with respect to the
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original e 5 billion budget—it more than triples.
With respect to the group of pulled forward purchases, we find λ(p) to be estimated as
zero. Thus, the rate of pull-forward sales is constant over time and given by µ(p) =4,485.68.
Therefore, from every month between December, 2009, through December, 2010, ca. 4,500
purchases were pulled forward to every month during the program period from February, 2009,
through November, 2009. Overall, this translates into approximately 550,000 pull-forward
purchases (β(p)).
The rate of postponing by only a marginally amount of time is well above 6,000 (see
the mid panel of Figure 7), and it shrinks to zero when the maximal time span of delaying,
t3 − t0 = 17.8, is reached. Overall, this translates into almost 260,000 purchases (β(d)) of
non-subsidized cars that were postponed in order to avoid the time span during which the
Cash-for-Clunkers program was in force.
Although no part of Model (13) is concerned with windfall gains, we can estimate the
amount of this group indirectly by subtracting the amounts of on-top and pull-forward sales
from the overall number of subsidized purchases. We thus find an estimate of almost 530,000
(β(w) := 1,933,090 −(β(o) + β(p))), showing that more than 25% of the program’s budget were
wasted to subsidize people who had wanted to buy a new car anyway. Note that if we had
ignored the possibility of delayed, non-subsidized purchases, we would have wrongly concluded
that only 310,000 sales were pulled forward in time, and, as a consequence, we would have
overestimated the number of windfall gains by 240,000.
Effects on the Environment: Back-of-the-Envelope Calculations
For the years 2009 and 2010, the time during which the Cash-for-Clunkers program was
effective, Table 3 displays actual and counterfactual numbers of new registrations as well as
corresponding CO2 emissions, and combines them into CO2 emissions per kilometer driven
of all newly registered cars in 2009 and 2010. Again, we find that the actual, overall amount
of registrations (6,681,693) exceeds the corresponding counterfactual amount (5,825,610) by
the number of on-top purchases (856,083), i.e., the number of purchases that happened only
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Table 3: Results for Registrations and Emissions
Actual (CC) Counterfactual (Non-CC)
2009 2010 2009–2010 2009 2010 2009–2010
Registrations 3,794,418 2,887,275 6,681,693 2,685,181 3,140,429 5,825,610
∅ CO2 154 151.1 158.53 148.86
CO2/km 584,340,372 436,267,253 1,020,607,625 425,680,401 467,481,749 893,162,150
Note: Actual and counterfactual numbers of new registrations, CO2 emissions per average newly registered car (g/km), and
CO2 emissions of all newly registered cars (g/km), for 2009, 2010, and its difference where applicable.
because of the subsidy.32 With respect to CO2 emissions per kilometer driven, the actual
and counterfactual pool of newly registered cars in 2009 and 2010 differ by 1,020,607,625 −
893,162,150 = 127,445,475 g/km, i.e., by roughly 127 tons per kilometer. Thus, if we were to
assume that non-subsidized buyers as well as new car owners who shifted their purchase in
time were not influenced by the scrappage program with respect to the type of car they bought,
then the difference in emissions could only stem from on-top sales. We would then deduce that
these vehicles emit 127,445,475 / 853,864 = 148.87 gram of CO2 per kilometer driven. However,
this number does not seem plausible: average CO2 emissions per kilometer driven of the two
million subsidized cars were only 142 g/km, as reported by official institutions (IFEU, 2009).
Moreover, if on-top sales emitted 148.87 g/km, then the groups of pull-forward purchases and
windfall gains would belong to cars which emit only (1,933,090 × 142 - 853,864 × 148.87) /
(1,033,090 - 853,864) = 136.56 g/km. Hence, the rather implausible conclusion would be that
cars which had been purchased only because they were subsidized and consequently can be
assumed to be rather small vehicles characterized by low emission figures, emitted more CO2
than cars that would have been bought anyway and thus can be assumed to be rather larger,
more polluting cars.
If we adopt a more plausible, but still conservative assumption, namely that the cars
bought on-top are not different from the cars which would have been purchased anyway,
then the cars of all these groups emit 142 g/km on average. As a consequence, the difference
between actual and counterfactual pollution, 127,445,475 g/km, is only partially explained by
the emissions of on-top purchases, as these then only account for 853,864 × 142 = 121,248,688
32Recall that from the disentangling above, we obtained 853,864 for the number of on-top sales, re-assuring
the validity of our model.
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g/km. The difference of 127,445,475 − 121,248,688 = 6,196,787 g/km must consequently stem
from ’upgrading’ by buyers who wanted to buy a new car in 2009–2010 anyway, i.e., from
using the scrappage premium to buy larger, more polluting cars than initially planned. More
precisely, the average car of the pull-forward and windfall groups would in the absence of the
intervention have emitted 6,196,787 / (1,933,090 − 853,864) = 5.74 g/km less than it actually
does. Eventually, we consider an even more plausible assumption, namely that on-top sales on
average emit 135 g/km, slightly less than the overall average of all subsidized vehicles of 142
g/km. Under this scenario, we arrive at an average upgrading by the groups of pull-forward
and windfall of (127,445,475 − 853,864 × 135) / (1,933,090 − 853,864) = 11.28 g/km.
With respect to pull-forward sales only, there is an immediate reduction of emissions due
to scrapping the old car and driving a new, typically more eco-friendly vehicle. According to
official institutions (IFEU, 2009), scrapped cars on average emitted 200 g/km, considerably
more than the subsidized new cars’ average value of 142 g/km. As purchases on average were
pulled forward by roughly one year, the reduction will equal 58 g per km driven for 550,000
cars over one year. However, this is a very short-lived effect that reduces overall emissions
only during the one-year time span over which the purchase was pulled forward. For the
group of windfall gains, there is even no such effect at all, as they would have bought a new
car in 2009 anyway. However, there is considerable evidence that people who wanted to buy
a new car in 2009 or 2010 (pull-forward and windfall groups) used the premium of e 2,500
to acquire larger, more polluting cars. Over these new cars’ lifetime, 15 years on average in
Germany, this upgrading will lead to an increase of emissions. Even under the conservative
scenario discussed above, this would amount to additional emissions of 5.74 g per km driven
for roughly 1.1 million cars over 15 years. This is almost three times the amount of emissions
saved by the group of pull-forward sales by replacing their clunkers early with new, eco-friendly
cars. Thus, it might well be the case that the Cash-for-Clunkers program was not benefiting
the environment, but even hurting it.33
33Note that it is essentially impossible to tell what effect the group of on-top purchases caused on the envi-
ronment. There is no information available whether and when these car owners in absence of the intervention
would have bought a used car, or whether they would have retired their old car completely, falling back to
public transport, motorbikes, or some other means of transport.
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6 Conclusion
Car scrappage subsidies are supposed to smooth negative impacts on one of the most im-
portant markets within the economy. Since vehicle retirement plans typically involve goals
beyond hard sales figures—above all, environmental aspects—and demand a substantial bud-
get, a sound decision on a particular policy intervention becomes not only more difficult but
also potentially more expensive. In order to being able to examine the impact of scrapping
schemes, in our case on car purchases and respective CO2 emissions in Germany, it is key to
compute reliable counterfactuals. To this end, we develop MSCMT, the multivariate synthetic
control method using time series of economic predictors, and combine this approach with a
cross-validation to select optimal predictor weights. We further show that the MSCMT ef-
fect estimator is (asymptotically) unbiased under quite general conditions regarding the data
generating process.
We find that the policy intervention indeed provided substantial short-run and long-run
stimulus to the new car market. Being the number one European country in terms of employees
within the automotive market and regarding new passenger cars production, the German
scrappage program distinctly stabilized one of its most important markets and its overall
economy. It did so by not only borrowing car purchases from the future but also by generating
a large amount of additional sales on top of regular ones within the program period. Technically
disentangling our estimates reveals that out of the 2 million subsidized vehicles about 530,000
would have been purchased anyway (windfall gains); without the intervention, roughly 550,000
cars would have been bought at a later point in time (pull-forward effects), while about
260,000 non-subsidized sales have been delayed due to the intervention; finally, slightly more
than 850,000 vehicle sales would not have been realized at all without the introduction of the
scrappage subsidy (on-top sales), amounting to a value of roughly e 17 billion.
With respect to greenhouse gas emissions, however, analyzing the effects of the scrappage
program yields a more complicated picture. Because of the pulling forward of about half a
million purchases, the actual average CO2 emissions of newly registered cars in 2010 were
larger than they would have been without the intervention, as purchases of these small, eco-
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friendly vehicles now took place during the program in 2009, but not in 2010. This reasoning
also implies that actual CO2 emissions of newly registered cars in 2009 should have been much
lower than their counterfactual equivalent. However, we do not find a statistically significant
decrease of average CO2 emissions of new vehicles in 2009. This is probably because consumers
profiting from windfall gains and consumers pulling forward their purchases were lured by the
e 2,500 subsidy into buying larger, less eco-friendly cars, and the corresponding increase in
average CO2 emissions at least partially offsets the above mentioned decrease. Therefore, the
scrappage premium had at least three effects, working in different directions. First, a reduction
of emissions due to earlier replacing of old, heavily polluting cars. Second, a corresponding
increase of emissions because many non-subsidized buyers postponed their purchases, thereby
slightly prolonging the lifetime of their old cars. And third, an increase of emissions due to
several subsidized buyers using parts of the scrappage premium to buy larger, more polluting
cars, which probably was the largest of these effects.
To sum up, we find that the German scrappage program considerably backed its domestic
economy by boosting vehicle sales, albeit at the potential cost of hurting the environment by
increasing greenhouse gas emissions. Because of these economic and ecological effects working
in very opposite directions, it is not trivial to give clear advice for car retirement schemes
to come. We have seen that particularly the category of windfall gains led to undesirable
consequences which are twofold. First, it wastes quite a share (one fourth) of the subsidy funds,
since those cars would have also been purchased in absence of a scrappage program. Second,
it hurts the environment by producing a substantial amount of additional CO2 emissions due
to a subsidy-induced vehicle upgrade. In practice, such effects probably cannot be completely
avoided, because it is virtually impossible to dis-incentivize people profiting from windfall
gains. However, in times of crisis, policy makers should keep in mind that people who postpone
their purchases today constitute tomorrow’s group of windfall gains. Thus, if one opts for a
scrappage program, it should be introduced as early as possible. Then, the replacement of
old, heavily polluting cars will not be delayed during the crisis’ early stage. This is not only
directly beneficial for the environment, but also indirectly by preventing the piling up of old
cars, i.e., the growth of the future group of windfall gains.
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A Proofs
Proposition 3 (Restatement of Proposition 1). Denoting by T0 the time of the intervention,
we have:
1. the bias of the vector of effect estimators, (Y11t − Ŷ11t(W ), . . . , YK1t − ŶK1t(W ))′, condi-
tional on FT0, the information up to time T0, is a linear function of the p approximation
errors eT0(W ), . . . , eT0−(p−1)(W ),
2. if T0 ≥ p and the weights W ∗ = (w∗2, . . . , w∗J+1) satisfy X1,t =
J+1∑
j=2
w∗jXj,t for t =
T0, . . . , T0 − (p − 1), then E(et(W )|FT0) = 0 for all t ≥ T0 + 1, and the vector of
effect estimators is unbiased.
Proof. Equations (4) and (5) entail that, in order to prove the first assertion, it is enough to
show that E(et(W )|FT0) = 0 for t > T0. We start by considering the case t = T0 +1, for which
eT0+1(W ) =
p∑
h=1
Ah,T0+1eT0+1−h(W ) +
J+1∑
j=2
wj (ε1,T0+1 − εj,T0+1) .
The expectation of
J+1∑
j=2
wj (ε1,T0+1 − εj,T0+1) conditional on FT0 , is zero. Thus, the conditional
expectation of eT0+1(W ) is given by
E (eT0+1(W )|FT0) = E (A1,T0+1|FT0) eT0(W ) + . . .+ E (Ap,T0+1|FT0) eT0−(p−1)(W ),
which completes the proof of the first assertion for the case t = T0 + 1. For t > T0, we can
proceed by using induction, as et(W ) is given by the recursion et(W ) =
p∑
h=1
Ah,tet−h(W ) +
J+1∑
j=2
wj (ε1,t − εj,t), where the conditional expectations of
J+1∑
j=2
wj (ε1,t − εj,t) given FT0 vanish
for all t > T0.
The second assertion follows immediately from the first one, as X1,t =
J+1∑
j=2
w∗jXj,t for
t = T0, . . . , T0 − (p− 1) is tantamount to et(W ∗) = 0 for t = T0, . . . , T0 − (p− 1).
Proposition 4 (Restatement of Proposition 2). In the presence of unobserved confounders,
if W ∗ is such that X1,t =
J+1∑
j=2
w∗jXj,t for t = 1, . . . , T0, the vector of effect estimators is
asymptotically unbiased under some technical assumptions, i.e., the bias vanishes when the
pre-treatment time span grows to infinity.
Proof. For t = 1, . . . , T0, we have et(W ∗) = 0 due to X1,t =
j+1∑
j=2
w∗jXj,t. This im-
plies 0 =
J+1∑
j=2
w∗j (u1,t − uj,t + ε1,t − εj,t) for t = p + 1, . . . , T0 as well as eT0+1(W ∗) =
40
J+1∑
j=2
w∗j (u1,T0+1 − uj,T0+1 + ε1,T0+1 − εj,T0+1). For every k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, considering the k-th
component, we thus have 0 =
J+1∑
j=2
w∗j
(
u
(k)
1,t − u(k)j,t + ε(k)1,t − ε(k)j,t
)
for t = p + 1, . . . , T0 and
eT0+1(W ∗)(k) =
J+1∑
j=2
w∗j
(
u
(k)
1,T0+1 − u(k)j,T0+1 + ε(k)1,T0+1 − ε(k)j,T0+1
)
. Inserting the definition of uj,t,
we get u(k)j,t = λk,tµk,j, implying 0 =
J+1∑
j=2
w∗j
(
λk,t (µk,1 − µk,j) + ε(k)1,t − ε(k)j,t
)
for t = p+ 1, . . . , T0
as well as e(k)T0+1(W ∗) =
J+1∑
j=2
w∗j
(
λk,T0+1 (µk,1 − µk,j) + ε(k)1,T0+1 − ε(k)j,T0+1
)
. Stacking terms for pre-
treatment times t = p + 1, . . . , T0 and denoting corresponding vectors and matrices by the
subscript ’P ’, we get:
0 =
J+1∑
j=2
w∗j
(
λk,P (µk,1 − µk,j) + ε(k)1,P − ε(k)j,P
)
= λk,P
J+1∑
j=2
w∗j (µk,1 − µk,j) +
J+1∑
j=2
w∗j
(
ε
(k)
1,P − ε(k)j,P
)
,
with λk,P ∈ R(T0−p)×Fk and ε(k)1,P , ε(k)j,P ∈ RT0−p. From this, we find
J+1∑
j=2
w∗j (µk,1 − µk,j) = −
(
λ′k,Pλk,P
)−1
λ′k,P
J+1∑
j=2
w∗j
(
ε
(k)
1,P − ε(k)j,P
)
,
which, inserted into the formula for e(k)T0+1(W ∗), delivers
e
(k)
T0+1(W
∗) =
J+1∑
j=2
w∗j
(
ε
(k)
1,T0+1 − ε(k)j,T0+1
)
− λk,T0+1
(
λ′k,Pλk,P
)−1
λ′k,P
J+1∑
j=2
w∗j
(
ε
(k)
1,P − ε(k)j,P
)
.
We decompose e(k)T0+1(W ∗) as e
(k)
T0+1(W ∗) = R1,T0+1 +R2,T0+1 +R3,T0+1, with
R1,T0+1 := λk,T0+1
(
λ′k,Pλk,P
)−1
λ′k,P
J+1∑
j=2
w∗jε
(k)
j,P
R2,T0+1 := −λk,T0+1
(
λ′k,Pλk,P
)−1
λ′k,P ε
(k)
1,P
R3,T0+1 :=
J+1∑
j=2
w∗j
(
ε
(k)
1,T0+1 − ε(k)j,T0+1
)
.
Under some standard, technical conditions, stated throughout their proof, Abadie et al. (2010,
p. 504) show that the expected values of R2,T0+1 and R3,T0+1 vanish, while the mean of R1,T0+1
can be bounded by a function that goes to zero as the number of pre-treatment observations,
T0, increases. This concludes the proof for t = T0 + 1, while for t > T0 + 1, the result follows
by induction, as et(W ∗) is a linear function of et−h(W ∗), h = 1, . . . , p.
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